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M A RT I N V A N B R U I N E S S E N
On 21 November 2000, Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM
Chair at Utrecht University, delivered his inaugural
lecture entitled ÔMuslims, Minorities and Modernity:
The Restructuring of Heterodoxy in the Middle East
and Southeast AsiaÕ. The lecture compared Alevism
in Turkey with kebatinan in Indonesia, where adher-
ents of heterodox folk belief and practice Ð rather
than gradually shifting towards scripturalist, shari ca-
oriented Islam Ð were transformed into distinct reli-
gious minorities deliberately distancing themselves
from orthodox Islam. The following is composed of
excerpts from the lecture.
Transformations of Heterodoxy
The related processes of urbanization, mass
education and the rapid development of
print and electronic media have completely
changed the structures of authority and be-
lief in the Muslim world. Among the believ-
ers, there appears to be a general trend
away from various heterodox beliefs and
practices and towards conformity with
scripturalist Islam, although scriptural au-
thority is contested. The authority of the cu-
lama, the guardians of orthodoxy, is chal-
lenged by other categories of learned men
(and women).
Some Muslim communities have rejected
not only the authority of the culama but or-
thodoxy as such, in the name of a deviant,
esoteric interpretation of Islam. Alevism in
Turkey and kebatinan mysticism in Java, In-
donesia, represent two varieties of ÔfolkÕ
Islam that, under the influence of political
developments, reversed an earlier shift to-
wards scripturalist Islam and defined a
sharp boundary to separate themselves
from it. Both have fought for recognition as
distinct religious minorities on equal
grounds with Sunni Islam. Both have been
seen as potential allies against the rise of
political Islam by the secular nationalist
elites of their countries and have been
praised as representing an authentic na-
tional tradition. At the same time, however,
they both have been politically suspect be-
cause of their perceived predilection for the
left and extreme left. Heterodoxy, after all, is
always potentially subversive.
In the early 20t h century, Java witnessed
the appearance of the first kebatinan move-
ments. Mystical teachers with a smaller or
larger following had been a common phe-
nomenon, but now several such followings
were organized into formal associations
that outlived their founders. They estab-
lished rules for membership, regular meet-
ings at set times, and standardized medita-
tion exercises. Some movements estab-
lished chapters in other towns and even vil-
lages, organized by a mystical bureaucracy
that institutionalized itself. The teachings
were Ð and this is another novelty Ð written;
several have their own sacred scripture.
Reading and studying these texts became
part of the practice of kebatinan adepts Ð
something I like to think of as the scriptural-
ization of kebatinan.
After independence, most kebatinan
movements joined in a confederation that
lobbied for official recognition with a status
comparable to religion. In the context of the
political struggle between the Muslim par-
ties and the Communists and Nationalists,
the boundaries separating kebatinan from
Sunni Islam were sharpened, most kebati-
nan movements affiliating themselves with
the Communist or Nationalist parties. The
Islamic element in their belief system, which
had always existed, was often deliberately
played down.
The name Alevi is a blanket term for a vari-
ety of heterodox communities, formerly rel-
atively isolated one from the other, that are
found all over present-day Turkey. Islam has
strongly marked their belief system, but
they have distinctive rituals that are very dif-
ferent from those of Sunni Islam. A long his-
tory of oppression made Alevi identity a
stigma that many wished to conceal. Some
communities assimilated, at least formally,
to Sunni Islam; most Alevis enthusiastically
embraced TurkeyÕs secularism that ap-
peared to give them equal rights.
It was as recently as the late 1980s that
there suddenly emerged a strong and suc-
cessful movement to redefine, reconstruct
and perhaps reinvent Alevism as a religious
identity. This movement may be seen as a
response to two developments that deeply
affected the Alevis: the radical left, in which
many Alevis had found a political home, was
destroyed after the military coup of 1980;
and in an attempt to pre-empt radical Islam,
the new regime embraced a conservative
brand of Sunni Islam which it imposed Ð
though unsuccessfully Ð even on Alevi citi-
zens.
In response to this, a new type of organi-
zation emerged: the Alevi cultural associa-
tion, spearheaded by intellectuals of Alevi
background and financed by Alevi business-
men. It was these associations that reinvent-
ed Alevi ritual in the new urban context. The
AlevisÕ traditional religious authorities, a
caste of holy men whose status was inherit-
ed, were involved in the process but no
longer in leading roles. Lay intellectuals
published numerous books and articles
defining what Alevism was and what Alevis
believed, interpreting their rituals, develop-
ing something of an Alevi theology. From a
largely orally transmitted folk religion, Ale-
vism appears to be developing into a scrip-
turalist version of itself, a distinctly modern
phenomenon.
The cases of Alevism and kebatinan repre-
sent an interesting variation on the gradual
but inexorable shift from folk Islam to scrip-
turalist Islam predicted by, for instance,
GellnerÕs well-known model of Muslim soci-
ety. The emergence of a learned variety of
the local tradition appears to be an alterna-
tive. In both cases, political developments
were of crucial importance in the process.
Under other circumstances, it may not have
occurred. And even in establishing this al-
ternative, the communities concerned had
to engage scripturalist Islam and were to a
large degree shaped by it. u
